F-35Bs…West Philippine Sea

MAD has allowed Russia, China and NK to threaten the World to allow them to do as they please. I'm sure you are aware that China has stolen most of the South China Sea AND GOT AWAY WITH IT. Did MAD deter them? No, it emboldened them. If it will never happen, as you assert (not sure how you know) then surely the concept can be used to push China back and get them out of the islands they stole - or would MAD not work because China does not care? And if China does not care then MAD is not working and so China needs to be dealt with NOW before it becomes unstoppable. Btw, this view was shared, the day after I wrote my first piece, by a top American Military man - he said China has to be stopped now and I guess he knows more about it than me, or any member here.

Or shall we keep asking them nicely for the next 20 years, until they have 20 aircraft carriers, 100 subs, have taken over most of the world? And then, after China has been dealt with, we can move on to NK. Only Russia would be the one (under Putin) to avoid conflict with - but that country could well be democratic after Putin and maybe one day a member of NATO (or some World grouping) helping to stabilise the world.

 

Phew! Not on TOR is it?

 

While there are humans involved everything is vulnerable no matter how secure the system itself may seem. Robert Hanssen, Aldrich Ames, Chelsea Manning to name a recent few.

 

For the uninitiated can someone explain what SIPR and JWICS are ?

 

Google is your friend.
SIPRNet - Wikipedia
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System ...

 

I don't know so I ask the experts: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/07/destabilizing-danger-cyberattacks-missile-systems

After President Trump decided to halt a missile attack on Iran in response to the downing of a US drone, it was revealed that the US had conducted cyberattacks on Iranian weapons systems to prevent Iran launching missiles against US assets in the region.

This ‘left-of-launch’ strategy – the pre-emptive action to prevent an adversary launch missiles – has been part of the US missile defence strategy for some time now. President George W Bush asked the US military and intelligence community to infiltrate the supply chain of North Korean missiles. It was claimed that the US hacked the North Korean ballistic missile programme, causing a failed ballistic missile test, in 2012.

It was not clear then – or now – whether these ‘left-of-launch’ cyberattacks aimed at North Korea were successful as described or whether they were primarily a bluff. But that is somewhat irrelevant; the belief in the possibility and the understanding of the potential impact of such cyber capabilities undermines North Korean or Iranian confidence in their abilities to launch their missiles. In times of conflict, loss of confidence in weapons systems may lead to escalation.

In other words, the adversary may be left with no option but to take the chance to use these missiles or to lose them in a conflict setting. ‘Left of launch’ is a dangerous game. If it is based on a bluff, it could be called upon and lead to deterrence failure. If it is based on real action, then it could create an asymmetrical power struggle. If the attacker establishes false confidence in the power of a cyber weapon, then it might lead to false signalling and messaging.

This is the new normal. The cat-and-mouse game has to be taken seriously, not least because missile systems are so vulnerable.

There are several ways an offensive cyber operation against missile systems might work. These include exploiting missile designs, altering software or hardware, or creating clandestine pathways to the missile command and control systems.

They can also be attacked in space, targeting space assets and their link to strategic systems.

Most missile systems rely, at least in part, on digital information that comes from or via space-based or space-dependent assets such as: communication satellites; satellites that provide position, navigation and timing (PNT) information (for example GPS or Galileo); weather satellites to help predict flight paths, accurate targeting and launch conditions; and remote imagery satellites to assist with information and intelligence for the planning and targeting.

Missile launches themselves depend on 1) the command and control systems of the missiles, 2) the way in which information is transmitted to the missile launch facilities and 3) the way in which information is transmitted to the missiles themselves in flight. All these aspects rely on space technology.

In addition, the ground stations that transmit and receive data to and from satellites are also vulnerable to cyberattack – either through their known and unknown internet connectivity or through malicious use of flash drives that contain a deliberate cyber infection.

Non-space-based communications systems that use cable and ground-to-air-to-ground masts are likewise under threat from cyberattacks that find their way in via internet connectivity, proximity interference or memory sticks. Human error in introducing connectivity via phones, laptops and external drives, and in clicking on malicious links in sophisticated phishing lures, is common in facilitating inadvertent connectivity and malware infection.

All of these can create a military capacity able to interfere with missile launches. Malware might have been sitting on the missile command and control system for months or even years, remaining inactivated until a chosen time or by a trigger that sets in motion a disruption either to the launch or to the flight path of the missile. The country that launches the missile that either fails to launch or fails to reach the target may never know if this was the result of a design flaw, a common malfunction or a deliberate cyberattack.

States with these capabilities must exercise caution: cyber offence manoeuvres may prevent the launch of missile attacks against US assets in the Middle East or in the Pacific regions, but they may also interfere with US missile launches in the future. Even, as has recently been revealed, US cyber weapons targeting an adversary may blow back and inadvertently infect US systems. Nobody is invulnerable.

 

I am also puzzled why the free world allows Iran to attack shipping with minor consequences. They have 4 middle-size ports and 1 very major one. So tell them in advance that if they attack another ship the free world destroys one middle size port, then the next time (or if any retaliation) the other three middle size ports and then the one major port. If they want to keep going then their airfields and other infrastructure. But instead the free world allows them to do as they please.

Surely everyone here has met a bully at some time in their life - and it is so obvious they don't stop until faced with consequences. Twice in my life I have given threats to bullies, not actions (apart from a swift kick in one bully's shin) and on both occasions the bullying stopped immediately (one was a very serious case and against some very vulnerable people
- one text (he lived far from me) told that bully of the consequences and he stopped immediately and that text was a risk to me in its contents). You will never stop bullies (individuals or States) by accepting their behaviour just because it might have consequences - that is exactly what they depend on.

 

I think that’s exactly why Iran et al refuse to just give up and bend the knee - in their eyes someone else is the bully.